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Review of 'John R Searle-Thinking About the Real 






This book is the result of Searle's stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept 
in 2009 and all the papers except his introductory one and his final response are 
from persons associated with Munster. However, all the papers were written or 
revised later and so are one of the most up to date looks at his views available as of 
mid-2013. S has in my view made more fundamental contributions to higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone since Wittgenstein (W), and has 
been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like W before him) 
regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured 
worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the field, so 
one would think that every philosopher writing an article on his work would have 
an up to date and accurate understanding of his ideas. Unfortunately, this book 
shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles make major mistakes regarding 
his views and regarding what he (and I) would regard as an accurate description of 
behavior. 
 
Searle's obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology, as 
stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I 
have noted in many reviews). It was Wittgenstein who did the first and best job of 
describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a 
major event in intellectual history. Not only is Searle unaware of the fact that his 
framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which 
accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this book. As usual one 
also notes no apparent acquaintance with Evolutionary Psychology, which can 
enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary 
and biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
 
However, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or 
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as W insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how 
mind, will, self, intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ 
phenomena. Recall Searle’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ 
entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre 
that Searle should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will 
and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
As he notes “The neuro-biological processes and the mental phenomena are the 
same event, described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause 
bodily movement? …How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? 
…If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action 
is causally, you see analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as 
commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on our 
existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to 
the many basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. Since this review, I 
have written many articles extending the framework of the logical structure of 
rationality and commenting in depth on Searle and Wittgenstein which are all 
readily available on the net. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 






"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 
94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187"The limit of language is shown by its 
being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a 
sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no 
real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 




“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The 
chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously 
not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof”; and that they are not 
clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of 
kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same 
thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the 
different meanings of the word “discovery” when in one case we talk of the 
discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery 
of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 




"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) ”PI 107 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, 
that we can discover something wholly new.  That is a mistake.  The truth of the 
matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the 
grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we 
6 
 
have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” (said in 1930) 
Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it.  We have already said everything. ---Not anything 
that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is connected, I believe, 
with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. 
 
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), which is another 
of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked–i.e., I have never seen it clearly 
stated anywhere. 
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so 
after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who 
gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want 
to know when knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need 
to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is 
it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an 
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ability? Could knowing or believing that p be identical with a state of the brain? 
Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the case that p’, whereas one cannot 
say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and 
means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to 
faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and 
how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on 
– through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention 
the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if 
these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways 
in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their 
compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and 
its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works 
of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of 
PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) 
and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of 
higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS 
framework. 
 
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of intentionality 
I have produced the following table. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of 
personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
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Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better,  the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here 
and in  my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table 
by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision 
research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give detailed explanations of the table in my other writings.   
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World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 




No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 




A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 












I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 




A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
--e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 
into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of 
S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential 
(CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal 
use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not 
CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" 
and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less 
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useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, 
since it cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of 
"cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships 
(S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly 
causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" 
and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified 
by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think 
they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted 
and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow 
thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS 
originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In 
language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as 
intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the 
COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which 
is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
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perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-
only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W 
is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were 
propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the 
chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not 
be possible. As W showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be 
based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), 
which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 
of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious 
DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do 
indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the 
Pope wish to help the poor because it is right but the ultimate cause is a change in 
their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
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generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here 
that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote 
from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there 
whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at 
all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it 
were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know." 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
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remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his 
examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary 
perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is 
entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic 
value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the 
light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and 
our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as 
DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
“cognitive illusions”, “priming”,“framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course 
these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
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slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of  
“cognitive modules”,“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, 
“cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Now for some comments on “John R Searle: Thinking About the Real World” 
(TARW). 
 
The first and most important comment is that since I wrote this review my ideas 
have continued to evolve so even though I have revised it, I strongly recommend 
reading my more recent articles first, especially The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and 
Searle (2016). 
 
This book is the result of S’s stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept. in 
2009 and all the papers except his introductory one and his final response are from 
persons associated with Munster. However, all the papers were written or revised 
later and so are one of the most up to date looks at his views available as of mid-
2013. S has in my view made more fundamental contributions to higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone since W and has been writing 
world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like W before him) regarded as 
the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured worldwide. He is 
also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the field so one would think that 
every philosopher writing an article on his work would have an up to date and 
accurate understanding of his ideas. 
 
Unfortunately, this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles make 
major mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would regard as 
an accurate description of behavior. 
 
Recently there have been some exchanges between Searle and Hacker recorded in 
“Neuroscience and Philosophy,” which appeared as a result of Hacker’s views 
expressed e.g. in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience . Both authors score 
some points and miss critical ideas in the others work. I have noted S’s failure to 
appreciate W before. Hacker is representing W’s views or at least Wittgensteinian 
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views most of the time so we get as close as we ever will to a confrontation between 
these two geniuses of descriptive psychology --W and S. 
 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who totally 
missed W and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see Hacker’s paper 
‘PASSING BY THE NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE’S CUL-DE-SAC’ (though of course Q’s 
deconstruction has been done by many including S). 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and 
the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book Human Nature, esp. on p226-
32 is critical for any student of behavior.  It is a nearly universal delusion that 
“cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” is not but W exposed this 
many times. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific and mathematical 
concepts. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind that ‘action’, ‘condition’, 
‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. are all complex 
language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the early 
30’s. 
 
On p21 we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s work and 
one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read the later W more 
carefully. He refers to free will as an “assumption” that we may have to give up! It 
is crystal clear from W that will, self, world, and all the phenomena of our lives are 
the basis for judging-the axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and there is no 
possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we have two hands or live on the 
surface of the earth or that Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps this huge mistake is 
connected with his blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which I have 
noted. Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which he 
first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts of 
things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to 
comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you can’t 
speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is 
unfortunate that he does not use the S1, S2 concepts as it makes it so much easier to 
keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very un-
Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical elements, you 
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can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of perceptions and 
memories, in a way that it is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically 
structured representational elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the 
dispositional intentionality of S2 where conscious thought and reason became 
possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) please see above and my reviews of his other 
works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his reference to mental 
states as representations (actually ‘presentations” in here) with COS, is (in my view) 
counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the apple we see is the 
COS of the CSR (Causally Self Reflexive) (i.e., cause is built in) perception of the 
apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the same status (i.e., a 
COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. Thus, the mental states of S1 
are to be included with the actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s 
ontology and epistemology I don’t see the advantage, but I have the greatest respect 
for him so I will work on it.  I have noted his tendency (normal for others but a flaw 
in S) to mix S1 and S2 which he does on p29 where he seems to be referring to beliefs 
as mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in the 30’s that 
S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense of S1. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true only unconscious 
percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic EP. As noted, one 
can read Hutto and Myin for a very different recent account of the 
nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and which I 
have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a 
revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued to 
develop the naturalistic description of behavior and on p39 he shows how ethics 
originates in our innate social behavior and language. A basic concept is the Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is explained in his various books. 
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For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and other works. He tends to use the 
proximate reasons of S2 and S3 (i.e., dispositional psychology and culture) to frame 
his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as superficial unless it includes the 
ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables 
the description in terms of the unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and 
inclusive fitness. Thus, I would restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked 
to override their natural inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as 
“…people are compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to secure 
long term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
I won’t comment on the 11 papers, mostly of poor quality, which critique S, since 
he does a great job in his replies. However, I must draw attention to the only 
reference to W (p49) where the authors show they don’t have a clue about what he 
did. 
 
Any discussion of behavior benefits greatly from S’s concepts such as Prior 
Intention, Intention in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR etc. but these 
authors seem only vaguely aware of most of his writings. 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as 
stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I 
have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of describing 
the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event 
in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the fact that his framework is a 
straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the 
lack of any significant reference to W in this book. As usual one also notes no 
apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by 
providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the 
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superficial proximate cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on p202 
is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain is automatic 
true only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (normally in msec) it becomes 
‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 function that can be expressed 
publicly in language (and other bodily muscle contractions) as well. Thus, the S1 
‘experience’ that is identical with red or the pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or 
pain once we begin to reflect on it normally are blended together into one 
‘experience’. And for me by far the best place to get an understanding of these issues 
is still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else 
has ever described the subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must 
keep constantly in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, 
‘experience’, ‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—
even S stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly 
restate all of p202 separating the true only nonjudgeable S1 from the propositional 
S2 then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. And of course, very 
often (normally) words are used without a clear meaning—one has to specify how 
‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to be used in this context and W is the only one I 
know of who consistently gets this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional unconscious causal 
dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way to 
describe S1 states which provide the raw material for conscious S2 dispositionality 
which, from a biological evolutionary point of view (and what other can there be?) 
has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate 
explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which 
describes how mind, will, self, intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate 
them as ‘real’ phenomena.  Recall S’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious 
Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And this makes it all the more 
bizarre that S should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free 
will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that the 
confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, idealism, 
materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal susceptibility to the 
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defaults of our EP—TPI as he has noted, and bewitchment by language as 
beautifully described by W. As he notes “The neurobiological processes and the 
mental phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” and “How can 
conscious intentions cause bodily movement? … How can the hammer move the 
nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you 
analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is no 
philosophical problem left over.” 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer only 
if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a condition 
that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue of the 
satisfaction of that condition.” As “Meaning is achieved by stating a publicly 
verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is raining” is true if 
it is raining and false otherwise. 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as 
commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on our 
existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to 
the many basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. 
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